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As organizations work towards securing their digital assets and intellectual property from external threats, so the latest 
information security reports indicate that the biggest threat remains from inside. The insider threat has become one 
of the biggest exploitable vulnerability’s corporates face as a level of trust is placed in their staff, or authenticated 
users, on their network, to ensure corporate objectives and goals are achieved. While monitoring and surveillance in 
the workplace are considered symbiotic and go hand in hand as part of the employee relationship, the advancement 
in technological capability for electronic monitoring and surveillance (EMS) has escalated to such a degree that all 
aspects of an employee’s workplace routine can be recorded. This research-in-progress paper hopes to utilize the 
communication privacy management (CPM) theory to understand if increasing levels of EMS in the workplace affect 
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 Introduction 
In December 2008, there were 1.5 billion Internet users; ten years later this has grown to 4.3 billion users - more than 
half of the global population (Miniwatts Marketing Group, 2019).   As organisations introduce digital innovation to 
engage with this emerging economy the latest World Economic Forum report on global risks, rates cyber-attacks and 
data fraud and theft as two of the top five risks faced by companies (World Economic Forum, 2019). In 2017 for 
example, Maersk, the world’s largest shipping conglomerate, was infected by the NotPetya ransomware virus which 
resulted in more than US$300 million in damages. As the virus cascaded around the globe, it  totalled more than US$10 
billion in damages – this from a single cyber-attack (Greenberg, 2018). 
 
The top five information security breaches of 2018 resulted in 2,190 billion customer data records being exposed 
(Leskin, 2018) through either malicious outsiders, malware, or system weakness. However, the most damaging security 
threats are considered to come from trusted insiders (Cybersecurity Insiders, 2018), either malicious or negligent - the 
insider threat. The Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT) at the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie 
Mellon University has recently updated the definition of the insider threat to “an individual who has, or had, 
authorized access to an organization’s assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way 
that could negatively affect the organization” (Elifoglu & Abel, 2018, p. 62). Trusted users are therefore in an ideal 
position to exploit their privilege to compromise the information assurance (confidentiality, integrity or availability) of 
an organisations network system, data or premises (Ernst & Young, 2016). While organisations secure their digital 
perimeter with technical controls such as firewalls, insiders are already authenticated and have access to the network 
and knowledge of where critical assets reside; and because they are already within the organisations perimeter, 
traditional detection systems used against external threats (hackers), is bypassed. 
 
Until recently the insider threat did not mean much to organisations, and even after the WikiLeaks (BBC, 2017) and 
Edward Snowden cases (Wikipedia, n.d.), most organisations continued to mitigate threats from external sources. As 
trusted users, the belief that insiders usually do what is in the best interest of the organisation remains a reality. 
Whether intentional or not, the examples of the WikiLeaks and NSA breaches show how devastating the insider threat 
can be (Elifoglu & Abel, 2018), and multiple threat reports (Accenture & Ponemon Institute, 2019; CA Technologies, 
2018; Kroll, 2018) outline the impact insider threats will pose in the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, the persistence 
of the insider threat will continue based on the required trust organisations place in their staff, or authenticated users, 
on their network. 
 
Securing a corporate network, of any size, requires many steps, and both researchers and cybersecurity professionals 
recommend approaching information security in a multi-layered approach. Schou and Trimmer (2004) introduced the 
term “defense in depth” in relation to Information Technology (I.T.) security. This encompasses the additional security 
layers that need to be implemented to provide cover for the failure, or breach, of the initial security layer. Defense in 
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depth controls are usually divided into three areas: physical, technical, and administrative (Stewart, Chapple, & Gibson, 
n.d.). Combining administrative controls such as user awareness training with traditional technical controls such as 
firewalls and encryption have shown positive results in raising awareness to external threats (Eminaǧaoǧlu, Uçar, & 
Eren, 2009; Hagen, Albrechtsen, & Hovden, 2008; Shaw, Chen, Harris, & Huang, 2009). The defence in depth concept 
becomes an important security consideration when the end-user is the first line of defence (Maconachy, Schou, Welch, 
& Ragsdale, 2001; Schou & Trimmer, 2004), and is considered by many to be the weakest link in information security 
(Crossler et al., 2013; Willison & Warkentin, 2013).  
 
Monitoring and surveillance in the workplace are considered symbiotic and go hand in hand as part of the employee 
relationship (Ball, 2010). Job titles which include the word “supervisor”, one who inspects and directs the work of 
others1, have been used for centuries, and have been included in theories of management dating back to Henri Foyal’s 
1916 “Administration industrielle et générale” (Fayol, 2016). The implication is that monitoring or surveillance is part 
of the working environment and that “employees expect to have their performance reviewed, objectives set, and 
information gathered on their working activities” (Ball, 2010, p. 89). 
While previous supervisory intrusions may have simply been a manager looking over an employee’s shoulder 
(Townsend & Bennett, 2003), technological advancements in electronic monitoring and surveillance (EMS) allows for 
a more intrusive view of employee behaviour. Email and internet surveillance are well established channels for 
monitoring employee behaviour (Ball, 2010; Friedman & Reed, 2007; Oliver, 2002) and should form an integral part of 
a corporate defense in depth security strategy. However, there is limited research into broader EMS strategies that 
utilise new technologies such as Big Data and advanced analytics. While the nature of present-day EMS poses greater 
challenges to the employee relationship as the level of monitoring and surveillance can be considered intensive, 
continuous and unrelenting (Adler, 2001), the importance of surveillance within a layered defence is proving a critical 
component  (Accenture & Ponemon Institute, 2019; CA Technologies, 2018; Kroll, 2018). 
The advanced nature of next generation EMS technologies allows organisations to build employee data-sets 
characterising behaviour patterns and assigning risk attributes not previously considered. While studies of 
organisational infringement have shown a negative impact on employee-employer trust (Eastlick, Lotz, & Warrington, 
2006; Kim & Kim, 2011; Taddei & Contena, 2013; Wu, Huang, Yen, & Popova, 2012), the level of data collection and 
profiling of an employee’s behaviour patterns through advanced EMS technologies could drive employee fears of an 
infringement of their privacy thus also negatively impacting the employee-employer trust relationship. 
While monitoring and surveillance has been a tacit aspect of the employee relationship for decades, the shift in 
legislative requirements to secure data and personal information within the scope of doing business2, coupled with 
                                                          
1 Dictionary.com: mid-15century., from Medieval Latin supervisor, agent noun from supervidere "oversee, inspect"). 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/supervisor 
2 South Africa: Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) 
Europe: General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
Australia: Australia Privacy Principles (APP) 
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the ongoing advancement and diminished costs in information communication technology (ICT), provides 
organisations with the opportunity to extend their EMS capability. The extended technology-creep in providing 
monitoring and surveillance capabilities leads to the primary research question: 
 
How do increasing levels of EMS in the workplace affect employees’ perception of privacy infringement? 
 
While organisations may be implementing EMS solutions as part of a defence in depth strategy, the legal requirements 
placed on organisations to take due care in how they process and store sensitive information is becoming an 
operational requirement. Extending the primary research question of increased levels of EMS within the workplace is 
the notion of the acceptance of the increased levels of monitoring. This leads to a secondary research question:  
 
How do regulatory requirements influence the acceptance of EMS in the workplace? 
 
Having contextualised the research questions this research-in-progress paper continues with the theoretical 
framework and proposed methodology for the study. 
 Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
As EMS has expanded and become more advanced in its ability to monitor, so have the corresponding theories, 
frameworks and models developed to understand it. Procedural justice theory (e.g., Alge, 2001), information boundary 
theory (e.g., Stanton & Stam, 2003), the structural–perceptual model (e.g., D’Urso, 2006), and agency theory (e.g., 
Sewell & Barker, 2006), have all been used. As this study focuses on how the increasing levels of EMS in the workplace 
effect employees’ perception of privacy infringement, and therefore the primary tension between an employer’s 
interest in implementing or extending EMS, and an employee’s interest in privacy, it will utilise the communication 
privacy management (CPM) theory (Petronio, 2002).  
 
At its core CPM theory “presumes that people believe they own their private information” (Petronio, 2004, p. 202), 
and control of the this information is critical as disclosure makes them vulnerable. Therefore, ownership and control 
are primary elements in defining how individuals handle their private information. Based on this need to control 
private information, a dialectical tension naturally exists between maintaining privacy and disclosing private 
information (Allen et al., 2007). Based on Altman’s Social Penetration Theory (Altman, 1977), Petronio extended the 
metaphor of individuals setting privacy boundaries around their private information – the dialectical concept that 
privacy is based on the opening and closing of boundaries to others. EMS by its nature has the ability to cross these 
privacy boundaries and therefore create turbulence (Petronio, 2004). This boundary turbulence, where an employee 
loses control of their private information and potentially impacts their working relationship, forms the practical 
element of CPM in evaluating EMS within the workplace. 
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CPM has been used in many studies since Petronio created the theory in 19913, including social media (see Waters & 
Ackerman, 2011), e-health (see Jin, 2012), familial privacy (see Romo & Vangelisti, 2014) and children’s privacy 
orientation (see Bridge & Schrodt, 2013). While this section outlines the broader CPM theory, figure 1 summarises the 
elements this study intends to follow – how boundary turbulence potentially impacts an employee’s sense of 
organisational privacy which is tied to organisational justice (Alge, 2001; Ball, 2002), organisational trust (S. Lee & 
Kleiner, 2003; Rosenberg, 1999; Snyder, 2010; Tabak & Smith, 2005) and organisational commitment (Brown, 1996; 
Fairweather, 1999; Snyder & Cistulli, 2011). 
 
2.1.1 CPM Foundations 
 
Figure 1: CPM and Organisational Privacy Dimensions 
Petronio (2002) positions five basic suppositions that define CPM theory: 
1. Private Information: Individuals believe they own their private information. “Irrespective of legal rights, 
individuals often assume they have the right to control their private information, including when at work” (Allen 
et al., 2007, p. 176).  
2. Private Boundaries: Individuals assume they have the right to control their private information. This sense of 
control establishes a boundary where individuals can decide what and to whom private information is disclosed 
based on personal privacy rules.  
3. Control and Ownership: Private information that is shared or exposed to another party becomes co-owned and 
forms a collective boundary. Co-ownership of a boundary can lead individuals to feel a sense of vulnerability as 
the establishment of shared boundary rules offers greater permeability depending on the co-owner’s 
management of the boundary rules (Petronio, 2002).  
4. Rule-based Management System: Individuals depend on privacy rules to control their information flow. When 
information is shared, co-owners not only own the information but also the boundaries to that information 
                                                          
3 Google Scholar indicates over 9000 citations for Petronio’s journal articles and books. 
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(Petronio, Sargent, Andea, Reganis, & Cichocki, 2004). Privacy rules control who receives private or personal 
information; when, how much, and where this information disclosure occurs; and how this information might be 
concealed (Petronio, 2002). This rule management system relies on three processes to regulate the revealing and 
concealing of private information: privacy rule foundations, boundary coordination, and boundary turbulence. 
While all three processes regulating the rule-based management system provide insight to an individual’s 
perception of privacy, boundary turbulence is of interest to this study in relation to EMS. As the management of 
information between co-owners is not fully understood, and private information is either intentionally or 
mistakenly shared, conflict can arise between co-owners if there are differing expectations of these information 
boundaries.  
Management Dialectics: Dialectical tensions arise as individuals make “judgments about the degrees of privacy 
and publicness they wish to experience in any given interaction” (Petronio, 2002, p. 15). Individuals apply a cost-
benefit analysis to the sharing of private information and the feeling of vulnerability associated to this (Caughlin 
& Afifi, 2004). Consideration is given to how the information will be owned, used and spread – the establishment 
of boundaries, and the permeability of them (Petronio & Reierson, 2009).  
2.1.2 Boundary Turbulence in the Workplace 
The workplace offers the perfect environment for boundary turbulence. Employers typically take the position of 
information ownership irrespective of the personal nature of the information – if it’s on the corporate network, or 
within the corporate environment (email, phone calls etc.) the organisation retains ownership; often in opposition to 
an employee’s view (S. Lee & Kleiner, 2003; Townsend & Bennett, 2003). In addition, it is generally accepted by 
employees that organisations constantly monitor the quality and quantity of their work based on an employment 
contract.  
“For boundary maintenance to work, everyone must agree on the rules. When one person has a different idea about 
the way rules are formed and used, the management system may be disrupted and lead to turbulence” (Petronio, 
2002, p. 49). The uneven power distribution of boundary ownership between employers and employees (Petronio, 
2002) through the implementation of EMS provides the mechanism leading to the contestation of boundary ownership 
thereby resulting in turbulence (Mattson & Brann, 2002). This is exacerbated due to EMS (particularly e-mail) being 
“covert and unobtrusive” (Snyder & Cornetto, 2009, p. 479) and employees may form a privacy boundary under a false 
sense of privacy. Petronio’s (2002, 2004) boundary coordination (permeability, linkage and ownership) talks to areas 
where this boundary turbulence originates: where boundaries are fuzzy, ambiguous, or differences in the risk-
perception of revealing or concealing private information exist (permeability); linkages are created that contravene 
ownership expectations, or one set of boundary rules are applied to another boundary (linkage); or boundaries are 
ignored, misunderstood, intentionally violated, or the privacy rules are misused (ownership). Alge’s (2001) study on 
privacy invasion through workplace surveillance indicated that an individual’s personal identity, their estimation of 
self, as well as their public persona can be threatened when privacy is impinged. In addition, the quality of an 
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individual’s work life can suffer due to misunderstandings and knowledge gaps created by surveillance (Stanton & 
Stam, 2003). 
With the extent of potential monitoring undertaken within the workplace, it could be concluded that employee 
boundaries do not exist. However, a study undertaken by Allen et al. (2007) around email EMS within the workplace 
concluded that ‘‘interviewees reported no employee input into the development of privacy rules and limited 
expectations for even having private information, although they did articulate some privacy boundaries’’ (2007, p. 
192). While employers have the overall power in establishing privacy rules, there is still an understanding by employees 
of boundaries that employers should not breach. Upholding this notion is the recent 2017 judgement from the 
European Court of Human Rights in the case of Barbulescu v. Romania where the Court held that an employer’s 
instructions could not reduce “an employee’s private social life in the workplace to zero” (Raimondi et al., 2017)4. 
While inter-personal boundary management is a fundamental component of CPM, the dialectical tension that exists 
in managing personal information within the workplace, especially the violation of these boundaries with the 
implementation of advanced EMS, is of particular interest in this study as it provides an intersection between an 
employee’s feelings of privacy (and a desire to protect their personal information), and an organisation’s right to 
monitor their digital environment through EMS. 
2.1.3 Workplace EMS, Privacy and Employee Attitudes 
Privacy is an important element of both the formal and psychological employment contract for both employees and 
employers (Ball, Daniel, & Stride, 2012). Workplace EMS and privacy are related, yet distinct, constructs. While 
monitoring and surveillance convey the automated collection of information for decision making by management 
(Botan, 1996), privacy describes the ability a person has in  controlling access to that information (Altman, 1977; Botan, 
1996; Snyder, 2010). When individuals feel a loss of control of their personal information through EMS (boundary 
turbulence), they feel their privacy has been invaded (Alge, 2001). This loss of privacy, and the perception of control 
they have over their personal information due to EMS, influences their work-related attitudes (see Snyder, 2010). 
Employee attitudes based on EMS extend to organisational justice, trust in upper management and their commitment 
to the organisation.  
1. Organisational Justice: Organisational justice concerns itself with people’s perceptions of fairness in 
organisations (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). Fairness extends beyond the size of the organisation, 
whether it’s pay structures within corporate environments, or leave scheduling in a small office 
environment – the question of fairness is seemingly universal.  
2. Organisational Trust: Within the workplace it has been found that organisational trust develops from 
interpersonal relationships between managers and employees based on a “mutual degree of reliability, 
                                                          
4 In this case, an employer had accused an employee of using an internet instant messaging service for private conversations on a 
work computer. The Court held that an employer’s instructions could not reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. The 
right to respect private life and for the privacy of correspondence continue to exist, even if these may be restricted as far as 
necessary. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides for the respect for one's "private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence". 
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confidence, and security” (Nyhan, 2000, p. 89). Interpersonal trust is characterised as a “positive force 
from which cooperation is derived” (Scott, 1980, p. 158) and is considered to have three major, but 
overlapping constructs: fairness, confidence, and risk taking (Nyhan, 2000). The employee-manager trust 
relationship is further established through a mutual feeling that workplace engagements are considered 
fair and ethical (Nyhan, 2000). While developing and maintaining trust is a mutual, reciprocal process 
(Chory, Vela, & Avtgis, 2016), studies indicate that email EMS is interpreted by employees as an 
organisation not trusting them, and in turn this is reciprocated by employees not trusting managers (S. 
Lee & Kleiner, 2003; Rosenberg, 1999; Snyder, 2010; Tabak & Smith, 2005). Perceptions of a loss of control 
over their privacy can lead employees to mistrust both management and the organisation they work for 
(Tabak & Smith, 2005). 
3. Organisational Commitment: Organisational commitment can be defined as an individual’s strong sense 
of involvement and identification with a particular organisation (Mowday, 1998; Steers, 1977). While the 
understanding of employee-organisation commitment has developed over time: O’Reilly and Chatman’s 
(1986) work on compliance, identification and internalisation; and Meyer and Allen’s (1991) three 
elements of commitment covering affective, continuance and normative forms; it is Porter’s narrower, 
emotional definition of commitment as a “bond characterised by acceptance of an organization’s goals” 
(Mowday, 1998, pp. 389–390) that provides input to this thesis.  
 
Porter et al. (1974) identified three components forming employee-organisation commitment: 1) 
acceptance of the organisation’s goals and values, 2) a willingness to work toward achieving the 
organisation’s goals, and 3) a desire to remain a part of the organisation. Psychological contract violations 
occur when an “employee's perception that the organization has failed to fulfil one or more of its 
obligations” (Turnley & Feldman, 2000, p. 26), of which an infringement on an employee’s privacy through 
email EMS has been shown to be one (Brown, 1996; Fairweather, 1999). A reduction in employee-
organisation commitment due to email EMS (Snyder & Cistulli, 2011) follows the same pattern as the 
employee-trust relationship. 
 
By its nature EMS is invasive, be it CCTV, email or voice recording, personal details or behaviour patterns are exposed 
to employers. While employees may be aware of or have become more accepting of EMS within their working 
environment, a right to privacy and personal boundaries can be maintained (however tenuous this may be). This 
privacy/boundary position can be in stark contrast to employers who feel they have the right to protect their assets – 
either physical or intellectual. 
 
The communication privacy management (CPM) theory developed by Petronio (2002) provides an opportunity to 
understand the notion of privacy, the establishment of personal information boundaries, and the resulting turbulence 
created when these boundaries are violated. The dialectical nature of maintaining control over personal information 
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and sharing the information relates directly to EMS within the workplace. Previous studies involving workplace e-mail 
monitoring and privacy (Alge, 2001; Allen et al., 2007; S. Lee & Kleiner, 2003; Snyder, 2010) indicate that CPM is the 
“ideal framework to illustrate employees’ ability to maintain healthy relationships with top management through the 
control of the open–closed dialectic” (Snyder & Cistulli, 2011, p. 127).  
 
 
Figure 2: Privacy vs EMS 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the possible results when an individual experiences boundary turbulence in the workplace due to 
increased EMS. Would the area of boundary turbulence and organisational privacy dimensions be reduced if 
regulatory requirements influence the acceptance of EMS technologies within the workplace? 
 Proposed Methodology 
 
Section two positioned Petronio’s communication privacy management theory as the best-suited theoretical approach 
to this study. Previous studies involving workplace e-mail monitoring and privacy recommend utilising case study as a 
methodological strategy in further exploring the impact of EMS on privacy (Holland et al., 2015).  
 
Limitations from previous surveillance studies include self-reporting and sample sizes (Chang et al., 2015; Holland et 
al., 2015) and a recommendation to better understand the influence that legal regulations could have on workplace 
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privacy expectations (Chang et al., 2015). This research will adopt an explanatory approach using the breadth of 
methods offered by case study research using the interpretive paradigm with the aim to provide a theoretical 
contribution by discovering the antecedents driving the outcomes of previous surveillance self-reporting research. 
Case study research lends itself to multiple data collection methods. While interviews are considered the corner-stone 
of case study research (Darke, Shanks, & Broadbent, 1998), interpretation of only interview material by the researcher 
may limit the validity of the research (Yin, 2017). This research will supplement participant interviews with 
questionnaires, documents and memoranda, unstructured interviews, and focus groups to provide for triangulation 
and the opportunity to present an objective view of events in relation to subjective interpretations of participants 
(Benbasat et al., 1987). 
 
As interpretive methodologies attempt to understand a phenomenon from an individual’s perspective by investigating 
interactions among individuals (Creswell, 2009) and the world around them – asking the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions of 
human experience (Given, 2008) therefore provide both meaning and context of human behaviour. The components 
informing the interpretive paradigm align with both CPM and the research question: 
• Personal information is different from person to person based on their individual engagements with the world 
around them. 
• Privacy rules are developed by individuals based on their social environments, gender and cultural norms. 
• CPM is contextualised as interpersonal or intrapersonal and is considered socio-cultural in tradition. 
• The research will attempt to identify similarities in meaning of the privacy infringement phenomena within a 
defined social environment. 
 
The research site selected for this study is based in South Africa and is actively engaging with the newly enacted 
Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) and its security requirements by implementing a next-generation EMS 
solution. This offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the effect POPIA has on workplace privacy expectations, and the 
reality of employee’s perceptions of their privacy being infringed upon. 
 
As per Chang et al.’s (2015) recommendation, reviewing the influence of POPIA on workplace privacy expectations 
offers a new area of research within South Africa. While the South African Information Regulator has proactively 
engaged with business about POPIA’s requirements to promote the protection of personal information processed by 
public and private bodies, early indications show limited awareness of POPIA in the public domain (Netshakhuma, 
2019).  
 Conclusion 
While this research poses a primary and secondary research question, they are closely aligned. The President of South 
Africa proclaimed the commencement of POPIA on 1 July 2020, with all institutions having 12 months from this date 
to comply with the Act. The South African Information Regulator (Regulator) an independent body established in terms 
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of section 39 of POPIA is empowered to monitor and enforce compliance by public and private bodies with the 
provisions therein. The Regulator has engaged with businesses over the past 2 years through various workshops and 
conferences outlining POPIA and its respective sections, requirements and controls. 
The aim of this research is two-fold. At a theoretical level it aims to extend the understanding of privacy in the 
workplace, especially the potential acceptance (or not) of perceived privacy infringements through legislation-induced 
electronic monitoring and surveillance (Chang, Liu, & Lin, 2015). Practically, as this research will undertake a case study 
methodology, it will provide tangible insights and output from a “live” EMS implementation which could be beneficial 
to organisations undertaking similar implementations (Holland, Cooper, & Hecker, 2015) 
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